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Abstract: Some conceptions of the role of philosophers in climate change focus mainly on 
theoretical progress in philosophy, or on philosophers as individual citizens. Against these views, 
I defend a Skill View: philosophers should use our characteristic skills as philosophers to combat 
climate change by integrating it into our teaching, research, service, and community engagement. 
A focus on theoretical progress, citizenship, expertise, virtue, ability, social role, or power, rather 
than on skill, can allow for some of these contributions. But the Skill View, I argue, uniquely 
captures the breadth of philosophers’ role in climate change; promises to make us more effective 
in practice; and offers a compelling way to overcome our own lingering climate denial by 
integrating climate change into all aspects of philosophical activity. 
 
 













 Many people feel a baffled contempt toward climate change deniers. Who would so 
blatantly disregard a broad scientific consensus? What are these people thinking? I had those 
questions, until I read Naomi Klein’s This Changes Everything (Klein 2014). Klein’s introduction 
offers what was, to me, a fundamentally different way of understanding denial. I thought deniers 
were people who asserted a negation: in this case, that climate change is not real, or not caused by 
humans. Klein describes a constant ‘looking away’, or inability to face something, that is much 
closer to denial in grief (Cohen 2001: 8; Norgaard 2011: 10-11). When we lose a loved one, we 
can usually tell others that the person has died. We rarely say that she is still alive. But we can still 
be in denial, in the sense that we have not yet integrated the loss into our lives. We reach for the 
phone to share good news with her; she occurs to us when we wonder who to travel with; we 
cannot take in that she is gone. 
 Reading Klein's introduction brought me one of my most memorable moments of 
conceptual change. I put down the book and thought: I’m a climate change denier. All my friends 
are climate change deniers. We are the deniers. We say it is real, but we rarely feel or act like it is. 
We go to an airline booking site to visit a friend for the weekend; we still think we might see the 
Great Barrier Reef some day; we have no plans that match the scale of the change. We are climate 
change deniers. 
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 This was a conceptual and, in a way, a philosophical change, that changed the course of 
my life. Reconceiving denial allowed me to become more interested, and to look directly at the 
stunning impacts of climate change. It led me into climate activism. I am not sure whether I am 
still a climate change denier. But this is one example of a philosophical change of mind with a 
tangible impact. And it raises a good question: in the context of climate change, what would the 
absence of denial be? 
 In what follows, I want to ask that question as a philosopher, and to offer an answer. We 
know that climate change raises many philosophical issues. The climate crisis presents what 
Gardiner (2006, 2011) has called a ‘perfect moral storm’, combining a global Tragedy of the 
Commons, scientific uncertainty, major economic impacts, unequal vulnerabilities, and crises for 
current and future generations, nonhuman animals, and the rest of nature. Philosophers are, I will 
argue, particularly well positioned to help stop the worst effects of climate change. Many writers 
take part in larger conversations that have the potential to reach a much wider audience. Most 
teachers have the ear of large numbers of students, whose interests and priorities we help to shape. 
Many teachers at the college and university level decide what large numbers of people will read. 
Philosophers have many of these opportunities, and the skills to use them. We have many years of 
specific training in assessing arguments, drawing connections between seemingly disparate topics, 
facilitating discussion and critical thinking, and articulating a compelling rationale when there is 
one to be articulated. We have already developed a thriving and varied literature on many of the 
key problems presented by climate change (Light and Rolston 2003; Clowney and Mosto 2009; 
Thompson and Bendik-Keymer 2012; Hourdequin 2015; Gardiner and Thompson 2017; Whyte 
2021). But we have said relatively little about our own role as philosophers.  
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  This is unfortunate. The role of philosophers in climate change is a large and complex 
topic, in need of systematic philosophical treatment. It is a part of metaphilosophy—as Overgaard, 
Gilbert, and Burwood (2013: vii) put it, ‘the branch of philosophy that asks what philosophy is, 
how it should be done and why we should do it.’ The question of what role philosophers should 
play in climate change is itself a question about the methods and value of philosophy, or of how 
philosophy should be done. As we will see, it also raises questions about the nature of philosophy. 
These metaphilosophical questions quickly lead into questions in applied ethics and political 
philosophy concerning responsibility and participation in institutions, and, I will argue, questions 
about skill and expertise. Our topic is also distinct from more often discussed topics such as the 
distribution of responsibility or the demandingness of morality, in asking how to play a role, rather 
than who should or to what extent. And it offers a fresh opportunity to reflect on many aspects of 
philosophical practice, in the context of a crucial and pressing issue. Philosophers often make brief 
comments about the role of philosophers in climate change; but as we will see, many of those 
comments do not withstand sustained reflection. We have good reason to think more 
systematically about our role in climate change, and to do it soon. 
In what follows, I introduce, illustrate, and defend a view of the proper role of philosophers 
in climate change. In §I, I consider two natural conceptions of that role, which I call the Theoretical 
Progress View and the Ordinary Citizen View. I argue that we should reject both, and I introduce 
an alternative, which I call the Skill View: philosophers should focus on using our characteristic 
philosophical skills to combat climate change. In §II, I offer five proposals that illustrate this view 
and put it into practice. In §III, I clarify and defend the Skill View, contrasting it with a focus on 
expertise, virtue, ability, social role, or power. The Skill View, I argue, uniquely captures the 
breadth of philosophers’ role in climate change; promises to be more effective in practice; and 
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offers a compelling way to overcome our own lingering climate denial by integrating climate 
change into all aspects of philosophical activity. §IV responds to objections to the Skill View that 
focus on some philosophical skills and not others, and on cases in which philosophers lack some 
needed skills, or are uncertain about having them. Together, these sections argue that focusing on 
philosophical skill is a particularly useful way to approach the role of philosophers in climate 
change. 
It is natural to ask why this discussion is limited to philosophers. Should everyone not 
apply their skills to climate change as they are able? I will focus more narrowly on philosophers, 
for four reasons. First, I think the Skill View is best considered concretely, by examining the 
particular skills of a group of people, even if it is true of everyone. Second, our topic is partly 
metaphilosophical, raising questions not only about responses to crisis, but about the nature and 
value of philosophy. These questions are important to consider on their own terms. Third, 
generalization can be too hasty. Graphic designers, janitors, therapists, and librarians all have skills 
to contribute in responding to climate change. But some landed gentry might focus on their wealth 
or power more productively than on their skills. Characteristic philosophical skills such as crafting 
arguments and facilitating discussions are particularly needed in challenging large numbers of 
people to appreciate the importance of climate change. Fourth, most philosophers need a push to 
appreciate the relevance of our characteristic skills to climate change, and to think in more detailed 
ways about how we can best contribute. Many of us are waiting for scientists, journalists, and 
politicians to handle climate change, or assuming that nothing will help. For these reasons, I 
suspect that the Skill View is particularly appropriate and needed among philosophers. But I think 





I. Three Conceptions 
 
 One natural conception of the role of philosophers in climate change can be called the 
Theoretical Progress View: philosophers should contribute to addressing climate change primarily 
by making progress on the difficult ethical, epistemological, metaphysical, conceptual, and other 
philosophical problems it raises. Callicott (2010: 34-35), for example, writes:  
 
So, who can lift the world out of the environmental crisis? Everybody has to do what they 
can, but the most important and fundamental job falls to us philosophers. It is our job to 
dig up, expose to view, and subject to criticism the flawed ideas about the nature of nature, 
human nature, and the proper relationship between humans and nature that we have 
inherited from the past. 
 
On this view, philosophers have a vital role to play, by exposing and criticizing the deeply held 
ideas that have led to climate change and other environmental crises. As Rolston (2010: 41) puts 
it: ‘Environmental ethics is vital because the survival of life on Earth depends on it.’ These writers 
do not say that only theory is useful, or that philosophers’ other activities, such as teaching, are 
entirely irrelevant. But their remarks suggest an emphasis on theory. If philosophers have the most 
important and fundamental job—if the survival of life on Earth now depends on philosophy—that 
job is unlikely to turn on reaching the small fraction of students who take environmental ethics 
courses, or even philosophy courses more generally. Our role, according to these writers, seems to 
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be primarily to produce writing that undermines and replaces the ‘flawed ideas’ that result in 
climate change. 
 It is natural to feel that these remarks are overstated. Surely scientists, politicians, 
journalists, activists, artists, and others have essential roles as well. But more importantly, I think, 
such views can easily underdescribe the possible contributions of philosophers. A focus on 
theoretical progress suggests a narrow picture of which philosophers have an important role to 
play; a philosopher of mathematics can seem to have little or nothing to contribute. More generally, 
a focus on theoretical progress tends to ignore our role as teachers and administrators, remaining 
silent on the importance of teaching and community membership and offering little guidance about 
them. We might hope for a view that offers all philosophers something to do, in various areas 
within and outside our jobs. 
Particular theoretical approaches partly address these concerns. Green and Brandstedt 
(forthcoming: 2) and others advocate for ‘engaged methods—methods of doing political theory 
that involve substantial interaction between the theorist and an actual or potential agent of change.’ 
A growing tradition of ‘field philosophy’ offers closely related approaches (Brister and Frodeman 
2020). In pragmatist traditions, as Kawall (2017: 19) puts it, ‘Ecopragmatists are committed to 
environmental ethics becoming more effective in shaping public policy and attitudes.’ I make no 
objection to any of these theoretical approaches. But, as engaged philosophers, field philosophers, 
and ecopragmatists can agree, a conception of the role of philosophers in climate change should 
include, in addition to theoretical progress, contributions as teachers and administrators, which can 
be either championed or ignored by advocates of particular theoretical approaches. 
 Resisting a focus on theoretical writing, one might instead accept what we can call an 
Ordinary Citizen View: philosophers should contribute to addressing climate change primarily 
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through lifestyle changes and political activity, rather than as philosophers. We can stop eating 
beef and cheese, use less and cleaner energy, and cut down on travel. We can protest, donate, and 
vote. Those of us who are highly paid academics, with large houses and busy flying schedules, can 
prevent especially large harms to the environment by reducing our own carbon footprint, and by 
donating to organizations that fight climate change. Surely these roles are important. When change 
is urgently needed, might these not be the most important contributions we can make? 
 This view offers an important counterbalance to the Theoretical Progress View, by 
emphasizing the non-philosophical contributions philosophers can make as people. It also offers 
another advantage. If anyone worries that it underemphasizes the importance of theoretical 
progress, the Ordinary Citizen View is easily combined with the Theoretical Progress View into a 
Hybrid View, on which philosophers should contribute both through theoretical progress and as 
individual community members. Still, I think, both the Ordinary Citizen View and the Hybrid 
View are importantly inadequate. Both these views still ignore the contributions we can make as 
teachers and administrators. They also ignore the ways in which our work in theory can inform 
our efforts in advocacy and activism. The Hybrid View is a Conjunction View, with theory and 
citizenship as two seemingly unrelated parts. It compartmentalizes central components of our lives 
and work, rather than offering a way to fruitfully integrate them. And it leads to missed 
opportunities. We can still rightly ask: what can philosophers do as teachers and administrators? 
And how can philosophers be effective as individual citizens? 
 I propose that we accept, instead, a Skill View: philosophers should contribute to addressing 
climate change primarily through the use of our philosophical skills. By ‘philosophical skills’, I 
mean the skills philosophers characteristically develop and use as part of doing philosophy. Some 
of these are the skills of philosophical writing. Philosophers have years of practice in assessing 
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arguments, drawing connections between seemingly disparate topics, coming up with useful and 
well chosen examples, collecting and summarizing the writing of others, finding and addressing 
objections, articulating a compelling rationale when there is one to be articulated, and presenting 
that rationale persuasively. Other characteristic philosophical skills are ones we develop as 
teachers and advisors, in areas such as facilitating discussion, public speaking, presenting ideas in 
accessible ways, building relationships with young people, supporting others to develop and 
defend their views, and challenging people to think critically about some of their most strongly 
held beliefs. Finally, many philosophers have skills as administrators and members of institutions 
and larger organizations, through experience serving on committees, organizing events, working 
with a range of colleagues, and running departments and educational programs. These skills are 
not distinctive of philosophers, in the sense of being unique to us. But they are characteristic of 
philosophers; doing philosophy tends to develop and exercise them. Noticing these skills allows 
us to ask how they can be useful in the context of climate change, and to put the answers to use in 
our own case. 
 What is a skill? As Pavese (2021: §9.1) puts it, ‘by and large people take skills to manifest 
in purposeful and goal-directed activities and to be learnable and improvable through practice.’ 
There is an active debate in philosophy about the nature of skill, and about the extent to which 
features such as behavioral complexity, expression in intentional action, guidance by knowledge, 
and improvement through practice are required for something to count as a skill (Fridland and 
Pavese 2021). I am inclined to agree with Fridland (2021: 247) that ‘skills, in virtue of their 
peculiar learning histories, rely on control structures that give rise to characteristic, controlled, 
intelligent actions.’ But others might count breathing, vision, and various automatic processes as 
skills where Fridland and I would not. This disagreement might seem troubling. If, as Pavese 
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(2021: §9.1) adds, ‘there is no consensus on what counts as a skill,’ can we understand the Skill 
View well enough to evaluate it?  
Fortunately, the Skill View makes no claims about the range of the broader genus ‘skill’, 
and does not ask us to accept any view about skills more generally. Instead, it brings our focus 
to characteristic philosophical skills, such as crafting arguments and facilitating discussion, 
which clearly are behaviorally complex, expressed in intentional action, guided by knowledge, 
and developed through practice. In this context, we can put aside concerns about borderline cases 
of skill, such as breathing, to consider which skills are philosophical skills, and which skills are 
especially needed in the context of climate change. The crucial issue will be the range of 
philosophers’ characteristic skills, rather than the range of skill in general. Still, it will be useful to 
notice that the philosophical skills I have mentioned display paradigmatic features of skill, and 
especially that they are learned and improve through practice. 
 Since philosophical skills include skills in philosophical writing, the Skill View includes 
the contributions emphasized by the Theoretical Progress View. It disagrees with that view not by 
denying the importance of theoretical contributions, but by rejecting a narrowly theory-centered 
conception of the value of philosophy. Since it tells us to apply our skills in a range of efforts, the 
Skill View also includes contributions emphasized by the Ordinary Citizen View. It certainly does 
not tell us not to contribute in these ways, although, as we will see, it de-emphasizes some of them 
in favor of others. But unlike the Theoretical Progress View, the Ordinary Citizen View, and the 
Hybrid View, it also includes our role as teachers and administrators, and promises to tell us more 





II. Five Proposals 
 
 I would like to propose five ways in which a wide range of philosophers can use some of 
our philosophical skills in response to climate change.  These proposals are not our only options; 
but they offer an organized set of practical suggestions, and illustrate the Skill View.2 
 First, philosophers can use our skills in constructing arguments, presenting examples, and 
finding connections between topics to integrate climate change into our teaching and research, 
including teaching and research on seemingly unrelated topics. As climate change comes to impact 
almost every area of thought and life, philosophy can lead, rather than fall behind, in offering its 
students opportunities to think through these impacts, from introductions to philosophy, ethics, or 
logic to advanced courses in epistemology, philosophy of science, moral psychology, aesthetics, 
diversity and oppression, and many different historical traditions. We can integrate climate change 
into a similarly wide range of writing, by including a chapter, section, or a few paragraphs on the 
often very significant relation of our particular topic to climate change. In both teaching and 
research, climate change is a key illustration, application, test case, motivation, or complication 
for views in many different areas. The more we come to see climate change as central, the more 
we will see it as relevant to almost every area of philosophy.  
 Second, I propose that we use our background in leading discussions and organizing events 
to hold events on climate change for our larger community. Some of these can be for a larger 
	
2 Parts of an earlier version of this section have been integrated into American Philosophical Association 
(2020: 95-102), which offers a helpful range of specific suggestions for integrating sustainability into 
philosophy courses, events, and department life. 
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philosophical community. Philosophy undergraduates, graduate students, faculty, and non-
academic philosophers can use more opportunities to talk about climate change and about our role 
in it, and to find collaborators with whom to think through and initiate sustainability initiatives. If 
we can use workshops on diversity and inclusion in philosophy, we can use similar workshops on 
sustainable practices, or on both in tandem. These events can be an effective way to bring together 
philosophers at different levels of experience and in neighboring communities. On the other hand, 
there is no need to lead discussions only for philosophers. Most of us have a background in leading 
discussions for a wider range of participants, and can organize and facilitate them for 
neighborhoods, places of worship, or towns or cities. Many environmental groups are eager to 
recruit new leaders and facilitators. 
 Third, I propose that we use our skills as administrators, committee members, and advisors 
to support climate change organizations both on and off campus. Student groups can often use 
encouragement, logistical support, and formal and informal advising as they form, grow, recruit, 
and take action. Off-campus groups are often hungry for student participants and access to 
campuses. Some minimal support can help others have a significant impact. Many philosophers 
already advise, organize events and presentations, and serve on committees. We can do the same 
with climate change groups, or consult with them as needed. And we can offer them our other 
skills by, for example, offering to attend, support, or lead discussions on climate change for the 
general public, or by writing letters to newspapers or officials in support of their causes. 
 Fourth, I propose that we use our skills, both in argumentation and in institutional service, 
to advocate for sustainable practices in departments and larger organizations. Many 
organizations pay little attention to sustainability, largely because their members do not seem to 
care. Philosophers who are department members can organize a group of other members to hold 
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or recommend an e-conference or e-colloquium series, or advocate for plant-based catering, carbon 
offsets for faculty travel, recycling, better food waste management, particular course offerings, or 
a department policy on sustainability. Employees of institutions of higher learning can help 
advocate for incorporating sustainable practices on a campus as a whole, everywhere from energy 
use to investment to curriculum requirements. Members of larger philosophical associations can 
encourage them to adopt, strengthen, and follow sustainability guidelines in general and on 
particular issues. Philosophers with relevant expertise can contribute to large projects and 
gatherings related to climate change, and play a role in policy decisions. And we can encourage 
others to do the same.  
 Lastly, I propose that we use our skills in research and collaboration to collect and share 
relevant resources. Organizations such as the International Society for Environmental Ethics and 
Philosophers for Sustainability collect and share syllabi and other resources. More locally, 
colleagues and friends may want to know what we have taught or heard of, or what projects are 
underway in a neighborhood or city.  
 These proposals have precedents in many efforts by teachers and writers toward civil 
rights, peace activism, and other causes, such as the large numbers of academic petitions and 
“teach-ins” during the Vietnam War (McCaughey 1976; Marshall and Anderson 2009; Collins 
2013). A growing number of models for following them can be found among our colleagues, both 
individually and in collective undertakings such as the Association for the Advancement of 
Sustainability in Higher Education, Philosophers for Sustainability, Engaged Philosophy, and the 
Public Philosophy Network. They also illustrate the Skill View, and suggest a range of ways in 
which acting on it might be useful. 
	 15	
Still, the Skill View needs clarification and defense on several key points. The next two 
sections address some natural doubts about the view and its justification. I turn first to more general 
concerns about an emphasis on skill, and then to some questions about which skills to use.  
 
 
III. Why Skills? 
 
Why focus on philosophical skill? To defend the Skill View, one might appeal to a 
utilitarian, Kantian, virtue-centered, or other ethical theory, and argue that it recommends that 
philosophers emphasize their characteristic skills in responding to climate change. But I think 
adherents of many ethical theories should accept the Skill View. So instead of assuming or 
defending one larger theory, I will offer a different, two-pronged defense of the Skill View. First, 
I will offer some considerations that can appeal to adherents of a range of ethical theories. Second, 
I will contrast the Skill View with initially appealing alternatives that emphasize expertise, virtue, 
ability, social role, or power instead of skill, and argue that the Skill View is preferable. 
 Imagine a philosophy professor who acts on the Hybrid View. She is beginning to write 
about climate change, and she donates to climate organizations, supplementing theoretical progress 
with contributions as an individual citizen. But she misses opportunities to discuss climate denial 
in her social epistemology course, advocate for sustainable practices by departmental committees 
she serves on, and prioritize online or hybrid conferences over long-distance flying. She orders 
beef sandwich platters for colloquium receptions, because that is what her department does. She 
cares about climate change and tries to reduce her own emissions, but her teaching and service are 
still business as usual. 
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There are many reasons for this professor to shift her focus to applying her philosophical 
skills more broadly to climate change. In a broadly utilitarian spirit, we might say that her doing 
so would have good effects, and, more specifically, would help prevent a great deal of suffering, 
both by reducing high-carbon activities and by fostering useful discussion and critical reflection 
among her students and colleagues. Kantians or contractualists might emphasize that her 
department’s current flying and catering practices not only allow or enable harm, but do highly 
significant harm (Korsgaard 2018: 220-25; van Ewijk, Stijn, and Paul Hoekman 2021). Harming 
others is generally harder to justify than allowing or enabling harm, even if one also avoids or 
prevents harm in other contexts (Woollard 2012). Following the Hybrid View may also make it 
harder to meet obligations to her students or her institution; many university and departmental 
mission statements set a goal of preparing future generations for the challenges of the 
contemporary world, and it is difficult to meet this goal without challenging students to understand 
and reflect on climate change in a range of contexts. Finally, as a virtue ethicist might suggest, 
integrating climate change more fully into her work life will likely counteract her own lingering 
climate denial, along with associated vices such as greed, cowardice, and injustice (Thompson and 
Bendik-Keymer 2012). She can resist all of these vices, and show courage and initiative, by making 
an argument for exploring e-conferencing options or plant-based catering. 
 The Skill View is especially suited not to a single ethical theory, but to the problem of 
climate change. Climate change is both urgent and pervasive, requiring ‘rapid and unprecedented 
societal transformation’ to reduce and adapt to its catastrophic damage (Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change 2018: 76). The five proposals I described respond directly to these two features. 
Like many other skills, philosophical skills take many years to develop, but much less time to 
exercise. The Skill View encourages philosophers to draw on years of training that we already 
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have, in ways that can be implemented much more quickly. At the same time, the Skill View is 
comprehensive, applying a broad range of philosophical skills: both expertise and more general 
competences, on and off campus, and in research, teaching, and service. Drawing on our skills in 
these ways, philosophers can have a broad impact, by challenging a wide range of people and 
organizations to think through and act on the implications of climate change for their own activity.  
 While these considerations present an initial case for the Skill View, one might wonder 
whether they would support a different response just as well or even better. Before turning to 
questions about which skills to emphasize, it is worth asking whether some other alternative might 
be preferable to an emphasis on skill. 
 Rather than focusing on skill, one might think, it might be better for philosophers to focus 
on expertise—on the relevant areas of philosophy each of us knows best (cf. Stichter 2015; 
Ericsson, Hoffman, and Kozbelt 2018; Fridland and Pavese 2021). In a special journal issue on 
academics standing against poverty, Pogge and Cabrera (2012: 171) emphasize that many 
‘academics undertake years of intensive training in subject and method, and their substantive 
knowledge may be equal to or even exceed that of the policy-makers, journalists, and others who 
do the lion’s share of issue-framing salient to poverty alleviation.’ Caney (2012) suggests that 
academics can offer two key resources—expertise, and credibility as experts—and can contribute 
in ways such as critiquing and explaining methods for measuring climate change, normative 
frameworks, and individual charities.  
These are excellent practical suggestions, and the Skill View encourages us to act on them 
when we can. But they offer no reason to ignore our other philosophical skills. In documents such 
as CVs, academic philosophers distinguish ‘areas of specialization’, in which they claim expertise, 
from ‘areas of competence’, which claim ability to teach courses in a subject area. In addition to 
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these specific competences, we also have more general competences, such as facilitating 
discussion, evaluating arguments, and organizing events. Focusing more narrowly on expertise 
ignores the relevance of these competences. It may also encourage some philosophers to engage 
in what Klein (2014) calls ‘magical thinking’, by waiting for scientists, or billionaires, or, in this 
case, experts, to save us from climate change. Specialists in philosophical logic, or in ancient 
philosophy, do not need to leave climate change to experts in ethics or philosophy of science. They 
can implement all five of the proposals I described earlier. The Skill View includes the important 
contributions of philosophical expertise, as part of a much broader range of contributions that rely 
on expertise, areas of competence, and more general philosophical skills. 
Instead of skill or expertise, one might instead focus on virtue. Why not aim to respond to 
climate change with courage, honesty, and justice, or perhaps with some more specifically 
philosophical virtues? Moreover, some philosophers have come to think that ‘virtues are skills’ 
(Stichter 2018: 3; cf. Annas 2011). Is the Skill View distinct from a Virtue View, and if so, is it 
preferable? 
 The distinction is not hard to draw. Even if virtues are skills, not all skills are virtues. At a 
minimum, virtue requires a relatively high degree of skill, making it natural to draw a ‘comparison 
of the virtuous person to experts in a skill’ (Stichter 2018: 3). Even at a high level of skill, some 
kinds of expertise, such as expertise in social epistemology, do not obviously qualify as virtues. 
But all of the proposals I made earlier require competence or at most specialization, rather than 
excellence. Like focusing on expertise, focusing on virtue is again likely to lead to many missed 
opportunities that require lesser or different forms of skill. Cultivating or exercising virtues we do 
not yet have can also be daunting or unfeasible, especially within the tight timeframe of responses 
to climate change. So if many philosophers think we lack the relevant virtues, an emphasis on 
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applying these virtues to climate change can obscure the ways in which everyone can usefully 
contribute. It can also encourage many philosophers to engage in yet another form of magical 
thinking, by waiting for a special group of virtuous philosophers to address the problem. 
Instead of narrowing our focus to expertise or virtue, we could instead broaden it to ability 
or capacity more generally, and say that philosophers should contribute as they are able. ‘Skill’ 
can seem too narrow a notion, just as ‘expertise’ does. Should philosophers not also make use of 
abilities that are not skills, such as the ability to pay (cf. Miller 2001; Caney 2014)? This question 
can resist a focus on specifically philosophical skills; writing a check is itself a skill, though not a 
philosophical one. But one can also doubt that, in contributions such as writing a check, we should 
focus on skill at all, rather than our assets and the abilities they give us. Either way, a broader focus 
on relevant abilities can seem to leave more room for the contributions emphasized by the Ordinary 
Citizen View. Key contributions such as donating, voting, attending protests, cutting travel, 
changing eating habits, and monitoring energy use can seem to require no special skills, or at least 
no philosophical ones. Why de-emphasize these in favor of more philosophical contributions? And 
why describe these contributions in terms of skill at all? 
 To answer these questions, we can begin by observing that all six of these examples are 
complex activities that raise their own difficult questions. Donate to whom? Cut which foods and 
which travel? How important is plastic? What makes a good protest sign? The difficulties are both 
empirical and ethical. To address them, it is useful to collect and evaluate resources, share the best 
resources with others, have discussions with friends and collaborators, and make reflective, 
informed decisions that accommodate a range of values, all while managing one’s time to balance 
these activities, and the research into them, with one’s other goals. It seems naïve to think that 
	 20	
characteristically philosophical skills are not useful here. If we have those skills, we should use 
them. Skill is needed to see which abilities are relevant, and to decide how to use them. 
 We also know that the primary sources of damage to the earth’s climate are collective 
organizations such as governments and corporations (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
2018). When I lead discussions of climate change, I am often struck by the extent to which 
participants are inclined to think only about reducing their individual flying, plastic, or home 
energy use. Philosophical skills such as crafting arguments, leading discussions, and organizing 
events are especially useful for encouraging others to think through and prioritize the most pressing 
needs for collective action, changing the minds of communities of people and shifting public 
policy. In other words, philosophical skills are particularly useful both within individual lifestyle 
changes, and in prioritizing and advocating for larger collective change. 
 Focusing on philosophical skill thus offers several advantages over focusing on ability 
more generally. First, it offers practical guidance, by telling us which abilities to prioritize. Second, 
it emphasizes abilities that are needed for the social and institutional changes that are especially 
crucial in the case of climate crisis. Third, it offers philosophers much-needed reminders of the 
relevance of our training, and of the particular social and institutional contributions we are 
positioned to make. Fourth, it addresses the metaphilosophical question with which we started. 
What can philosophy, as an activity or discipline, do in the face of climate change? The Skill View 
offers an answer. Philosophy can evaluate methods and arguments, connect seemingly disparate 
topics, generate discussion, and so on. The Skill View offers a rich set of relevant and impactful 
possible contributions by philosophy as a discipline, and reminds philosophers to use our 
philosophical skills even as ordinary citizens. 
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Instead of expertise or ability, one might also consider a conception centered on social role. 
According to Robin Zheng’s Role-Ideal Model, ‘we are, each of us, individually responsible for 
structural injustice through and in virtue of our social roles’ (2018: 873). Zheng emphasizes that 
role is ‘the site where structure meets agency’ (870, 876), and argues that, compared to a focus on 
power, privilege, interest, or ability, ‘Social roles…take us further towards specification because 
they are rich in content, which allows them to be action-guiding. For every role, there is some 
intuitive, salient, and relatively circumscribed range of associated actions’ (879). ‘Philosopher’ is, 
among other things, a social role. Might the role of philosophers in climate change not be best 
understood by thinking about the role of philosophers more generally? 
An emphasis on social role is in some ways closely related to an emphasis on skill. The 
‘philosopher’ role develops and maintains philosophical skills, and offers many opportunities to 
use them. Like the Skill View, reflection on our social role encourages detailed reflection on 
various aspects of our activity as philosophers. But it is worth noticing that Zheng proposes a 
model of responsibility, not meant to ‘adjudicate between role-ideals’ (876), or to choose between 
conflicting evaluative conceptions of the best way to play a particular social role. When we ask 
how to respond to climate change, as a practical question, there are several reasons not to look 
mainly to our social role as philosophers for an answer. First, simply following the commonly 
accepted norms or expectations of one’s role can lead to conservatism or blind obedience. An 
appropriate response to climate change may often call for what Lisa Herzog calls ‘transformational 
agency’, or ‘taking active responsibility for the moral quality of one’s role’ (2018: 202). As Zheng 
(2018: 878) puts it, ‘Constructing a role-ideal requires critical reflection on the purposes and aims 
of the role, how it might be modified to better achieve them, what auxiliary roles should be created 
or modified, and how to collaborate with others possessing similar aims.’ Critical reflection is a 
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paradigmatic philosophical skill. Second, even within the ‘philosopher’ role, we need to be 
reminded to ask what skills we have, and how we can use them to combat climate change. The 
Skill View focuses directly on this question. Finally, philosophy is not only a social role; it is an 
activity, using characteristic skills, which we can also engage in outside the social role of 
philosopher. If we join a youth-led project off-campus, our attempting to lead discussion, share 
extensive expertise, or even disclose that we are philosophers can sometimes be intimidating, 
dominating, or counterproductive. We can still contribute our philosophical skills as needed, but 
in a different role, as an ally or supporter. Focusing primarily on our social role as philosophers 
rather than on our skills can lead us to miss or misuse these opportunities. 
Similar considerations apply to a focus on power. When ‘power’ does not simply mean 
‘ability’, it often refers to social power or influence. But consider what happens when our skills 
diverge from the social power we have as philosophers. A philosopher who has recently left 
academia may no longer have much access to teaching students or influencing universities or 
philosophy associations. But she can still use her skills in many of the same ways in making 
arguments and holding discussions outside academia, advocating for change, and collecting and 
sharing resources. On the other hand, a prestigious philosophy professor may have all the power a 
philosopher can have. Which aspects of her craft she should focus on in the context of climate 
change will depend greatly on her skills. If she is an outstanding administrator and advocate, she 
may have the biggest impact by working to convince her university to divest from fossil fuels, 
change carbon-intensive building projects, or add a required course on sustainability for all 
undergraduates. If she is a leading theorist who struggles as a teacher, she may do best by focusing 
on her writing. Looking to our skills is a particularly useful way of guiding deliberation in the 
complex context of climate change. 
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 Of course, focusing on philosophical skill alone will not address all our practical questions; 
we will have to use our judgment, our moral theories, and our empirical knowledge to make 
decisions about how best to use our skills. Theoretical progress, contributions as ordinary citizens, 
expertise, virtue, ability, social role, and power will all be relevant. But giving any of these factors 
pride of place is likely to lead to many missed opportunities. A conception of the role of 
philosophers in climate change should include contributions in research, teaching, and service, 
across many subfields, on and off campus, within and outside our established social roles, using 
both our expertise and our other philosophical competences. A broad range of diverse 
contributions, together with useful practical guidance, is likely to have a larger impact than a 
conception that leaves many of them out. By offering both diversity and guidance, and by drawing 
on extensive training we already have, I think a focus on philosophical skill is especially likely to 
lead us to engage effectively with climate change. 
 
 
IV. Which Skills? 
 
 I want to turn now to some more specific concerns about which skills to prioritize. These 
concerns raise other objections to the Skill View, and offer opportunities to resolve some common 
confusions. 
Focusing on philosophical skill can seem futile or ineffective if one is worried about being 
a bad philosopher, or lacking the requisite skills. Some philosophers are terrible writers. Some 
never become good teachers. Many of us lack basic social skills. Perhaps we should focus on 
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donating after all. What good is focusing on our philosophical skills, if we (mostly) do not have 
them?  
 This concern is especially pressing for a view that emphasizes philosophical virtue or 
excellence, which many of us worry that we do not have. But philosophical skills more generally 
are exercised and developed whenever one engages in philosophy. It is extremely rare—if it is 
possible at all—for philosophers actively engaged in writing or teaching to completely lack even 
basic competence in every aspect of philosophy, such as argumentation, critical reflection, 
articulating connections between ideas, and facilitating discussion. Usually, the lack is partial. We 
can then ask, as before, which skills we do have. We may even have time to deliberately cultivate 
some relevant skills by, for example, finding mentors or attending workshops or training sessions 
that might help us be effective. 
 Still, there are some cases of severe and wide-ranging incompetence among philosophers. 
There are also philosophers who are exceptionally talented as artists or programmers, and can more 
effectively focus on those other skills in responding to climate change. The Skill View tells 
philosophers to address climate change primarily by using our philosophical skills. But like the 
view that dogs have four legs, the Skill View can allow some exceptions. Philosophers who are 
sure they are severely incompetent as philosophers—or exceptionally skilled in other domains—
can sometimes helpfully focus on their other, non-philosophical skills, or simply on voting, 
protesting, or donating. 
 Looking to philosophical skills can also seem misguided or ineffective in cases of 
uncertainty. What if we are not sure which skills we have, or which ones to use, or whether we 
have philosophical skills at all? We might not have catalogued and ranked our own philosophical 
abilities, and for many of us, climate change is new, offering unfamiliar challenges and 
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applications of our previous experience. Can the Skill View offer guidance? In its one-sentence 
formulation, it does not; but I think it naturally leads to some useful guidance in situations of 
uncertainty. The injunction to ask what skills we have is itself a kind of guidance. It tells us to 
think about our skills, rather than simply donating or voting. We can then articulate and enact 
proposals like the ones I made above; and we can each consider our skills individually, to help 
determine how we can be most effective. A lack of additional guidance can also be useful in 
leading us to ask others for collaboration and advice, and in encouraging us to be experimental. 
We may not know how best to apply our skills until we make a few different attempts and see what 
works. Here uncertainty is not a fatal problem, but a natural early stage in applying one’s skills. It 
offers no reason to reject a view, or to stop trying. 
 Focusing on philosophical skill can seem troublingly slow within the context of an urgent 
crisis. Good philosophy takes time; do we have enough time? This concern seems especially 
pressing if one accepts a metaphilosophical view that identifies philosophy with the production of 
philosophical writing. It is true that good philosophical writing can take years to draft, years to 
revise, and years to publish. Integrating climate change into philosophical research can sometimes 
take a decade or more. In the context of climate change, this can seem useful, but far too little and 
far too slow. But as we saw, the exercise of philosophical skill extends far beyond the publication 
of philosophical research. Here it helps to return to the five proposals I made earlier. Incorporating 
climate change into a syllabus or assignment, organizing a workshop on sustainable practices, 
engaging with a climate organization, initiating or participating in an advocacy project, and 
gathering or sharing resources can all be done within the timeframe of a few months. Urgency may 
help us decide which philosophical skills to use and how, but it does not present a general objection 
to the use of philosophical skills. The Skill View exploits many years of previous training with 
	 26	
activities that can mostly be undertaken relatively quickly. Still, concerns about urgency are useful 
in reminding us not to overemphasize writing or research over other forms of philosophical activity 
such as teaching or discussion. 
 In recent discussions of activism and climate change, philosophers have shown a closely 
related tendency to emphasize philosophical skills related to producing arguments. Miller (2008: 
119) writes that ‘What philosophers are uniquely positioned to do is to spell out the reasons we 
have to change our behavior to avoid damaging climate change.’ According to Light (2002: 559), 
‘if philosophers could help to articulate moral foundations for environmental policies in a way that 
is translatable to the general public, they will have made a contribution to the resolution of 
environmental problems commensurate with their talents and in a fashion compatible with the 
work of other environmental professionals.’ Here again, ‘The goal is to come up with ethical 
grounds upon which environmental policies can be justified’ (Light 2002: 562). In a more general 
discussion of activism among philosophers, Oxley (2020: 12) writes that ‘while philosophers have 
a range of distinctive skills, their argumentation skills broadly construed (including rational 
evaluation) are particularly valuable and can be used to contribute to activist movements.’ On her 
view, ‘Philosophers are uniquely suited to do the rational persuasion dimension of activist 
movements’ (16). 
 In times of denial, defensiveness, and fear, one might worry that a philosopher’s arguments 
will not be what persuades the public. Even if they can be made quickly, arguments can backfire, 
or simply not be what is needed. Oxley (2020: 17) notes that ‘A major objection to my view is that 
it is unduly optimistic about the potential for the public to be persuaded by reason.’ She replies 
that ‘although people do make decisions based on emotional appeal, in the end, we are also rational 
beings,’ who can be convinced over time, if philosophers ‘continue to use good reasons and think 
	 27	
about long-term beliefs and strategies for achieving stable epistemic states’ (2020: 12). But in the 
context of climate change, one might still worry that good reasons are ineffective, and long-term 
is too long. 
This concern can appear to be a doubt about the value of philosophy more generally. It can 
also express a metaphilosophical view on which philosophy is mainly the production of arguments. 
But as considering the Skill View brings out, the nature and value of philosophy, and of 
philosophical skills, extends beyond producing arguments, either in writing or in teaching or 
conversation. Most philosophers have years of experience in facilitating discussion without 
offering arguments of their own, including encouraging others to offer and analyze examples, 
bringing out the underlying motivations for a thought, and helping others make connections among 
their own ideas. We are experienced teaching assistants, not only lecturers. Even as lecturers, many 
of us use the Socratic method, or in-class activities designed to get students talking and thinking 
through their own views, rather than listening to ours. So if people need to talk more than they 
need to listen, we have relevant skills to offer (cf. American Philosophical Association 2020: 26; 
Brister and Frodeman 2020). An emphasis on theoretical progress can easily lead us to miss this 
point; so can an emphasis on expertise, since most philosophers are not experts or specialists in 
facilitation, in the sense of writing about it or being familiar with the latest research on pedagogy. 
Although offering arguments can be effective, the Skill View reminds us that excellence or 
competence in facilitating discussion can be especially useful in leading people to think through 
the implications of climate change. 
 If our skills are useful in these contexts, they are also especially useful in our own jobs. 
When many of us are so overworked, and intellectually exhausted, we may want to conserve the 
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more difficult uses of our skills for our normal philosophical activities. In addressing climate 
change, should we focus on skills we find relatively easy to use? 
 One response to this concern about conservation emphasizes the scale of the climate crisis: 
without ‘rapid and far-reaching’ transitions in the next several years, we face dramatic increases 
in projected warming, death, displacement from uninhabitable land, runaway feedback loops, ice-
free Arctic summers, and catastrophic ‘natural’ disasters almost everywhere (Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change 2018). Becoming more informed about climate change can make us 
doubt that our skills are more needed anywhere else. But I think this response ignores a legitimate 
concern about making environmental efforts sustainable in individual lives, so that we do not 
become burned out, miserable, and ineffective. In addressing concerns about exhaustion, I prefer 
to emphasize not the scale of the crisis, but the importance of integrating climate change into daily 
life. Burnout is most likely when we take on a large additional burden. Addressing climate change 
can be the way we sometimes write, talk, construct syllabi, plan class meetings or receptions, hold 
conferences, or engage with a broader community. The five proposals I outlined describe ways of 
engaging in these activities. Putting the proposals into practice can be part of a 9-to-5 routine, draw 
on skills we already have, show both competence and initiative on the job, and earn professional 
credit. Using our skills to integrate climate change into philosophy offers ways to counteract 
denial, have a larger impact, build careers, and avoid burnout. We do not need to focus on the 
philosophical skills we find least exhausting to use. Instead, we can integrate climate change into 
the ways we apply all of our skills. 
 The Skill View can address these various questions about which skills to emphasize. Still, 
the questions suggest one important qualification to the view. In using our skills to help combat 
climate change, we will probably have to do things at which we are not (yet) skilled. Talking to 
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others can lead us to discover more vividly that conversations about climate change can be 
extremely emotionally charged, raising powerful confusions, discouragement, grief, and fear about 
nature, our own survival, and the future of our families. Effective communication about climate 
might require a degree of warmth and trust (Heyward and Roser 2016), emotional vulnerability 
(Goldberg, Gustafson, and Sander 2020), or tact or fun (Oxley 2020) that are (unfortunately) not 
characteristically philosophical. Or we might find ourselves in contexts that require unfamiliar 
kinds of community organizing. We may or may not be skilled at handling these situations. Here, 
the Skill View never tells us to do only what we are already good at. It should not be abused as an 
excuse to limit ourselves exclusively to the areas of our existing skills. Our philosophical skills are 
an excellent starting point, allowing us to draw on years of relevant training. But to match the pace 
of climate change, we will likely need to try new activities, or new versions of familiar ones, before 
we feel ready. My emphasis on our philosophical skills is meant not to rationalize hesitation, but 





I have argued that focusing on philosophical skills is an especially useful way to approach 
the role of philosophers in climate change. Against alternatives that emphasize theoretical 
progress, citizenship, expertise, virtue, ability, social role, or power, I argued that these tend to 
leave out many important contributions, and that they often fail to offer helpful practical guidance 
or to emphasize contributions that lead to collective action. I argued that reflecting individually on 
our own skills, collaborating with others, and willingness to experiment can help resolve doubts 
	 30	
about our own skills. I addressed concerns about the effectiveness of offering arguments, with 
reminders of our skills in other aspects of philosophy, especially in facilitating discussion. And I 
responded to concerns about the need to conserve the use of our skills, by emphasizing not only 
the urgency of climate change, but also the opportunities for integrating climate change into 
ongoing philosophical work, as most of my five proposals do. Drawing on philosophers’ extensive 
training, I argued, offers a broad range of ways to combat climate change by affecting both 
individual behavior and collective action. 
The Skill View can be applied with various degrees of energy and commitment, and 
combined with a variety of views about the demandingness of morality. An especially demanding 
view might require quitting our jobs, or taking drastic measures. I doubt most professional 
philosophers should quit our jobs, considering the many philosophical problems raised by climate 
change and the central importance of educating and supporting students in this period. But even 
philosophers who do quit their job—or cannot find one—should continue to draw on their 
philosophical skills in responding to climate change. Similarly, philosophers who are 
overburdened, marginalized, or face heavy institutional barriers to climate advocacy should draw 
on their philosophical skills as they are able. Hard questions remain about the extent or 
demandingness of our obligations—but addressing these questions once again requires the use of 
characteristic philosophical skills. 
The Skill View is a metaphilosophical view, making a claim about how philosophers 
should act. Considering it suggests some ways in which philosophy can be valuable, and 
encourages resistance to identifying philosophy too closely with either writing or argumentation. 
I think it also encourages viewing philosophy as continuous with other disciplines and pursuits. 
After considering philosophical skills in some detail, I do not think I have found even one that is 
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unique to philosophers. Although our various skills are developed and exercised by doing 
philosophy, they are shared by many other writers, teachers, and professionals. So I remain hopeful 
that the Skill View can be usefully applied by many non-philosophers, although I have tried to 
avoid making any blanket generalizations about other fields without considering them in detail. 
 For philosophers, the sense that climate change is someone else’s issue can be expressed 
in an expectation that it will be addressed outside philosophy. This sense can also be expressed in 
an expectation that, within philosophy, climate change will be addressed primarily by 
environmental philosophers. An emphasis on common philosophical skills, rather than the 
particular expertise of environmental philosophers, is, among other things, a way of broadening 
these efforts to all philosophers. Thinking of climate change as primarily an issue for 
environmental philosophers is, I think, another form of denial or magical thinking. It ignores the 
many opportunities we all have, and it makes our progress too narrow, too lonely, and too slow.  
 Stopping climate change is not an activity for someone else—for someone less, or more, 
immersed in the theoretical issues. It is an activity for all inhabitants of the earth. Perhaps most of 
all, at this stage, it is an activity for inhabitants who can effectively challenge other inhabitants to 
face the scale and importance of climate change. Philosophers are some of those inhabitants. We 
are not the only ones, and we may not be the smartest or the most important. But for now, I would 
rather we overestimate our potential than underestimate it. Someone needs to get us—
philosophers, and everyone—to make our way out of denial, to appreciate the current situation 
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